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Abstract
In recent years stock option plans (SOPs) have become an important component
of managerial remuneration in most industrialized countries. Commonly accepted,
corporate as well as individual taxes have a major impact on the costs of a SOP.
In contrast, the tax influence on the benefits of a SOP remains widely
unperceived. This article deals with both –cost and benefit– aspects
simultaneously by integrating taxation into a principalagent model, where the
agent is compensated in options. Deriving the optimal quantity of options to be
granted and the optimal exercise price to be set, resulting profits for managers and
shareholders can be quantified. Comparing the results in a tax-free world to the
results taking into account different levels of taxation several tax-induced
incentive distortions can be identified.
         Keywords: stock options, principal-agent, taxation.









Dept of Business Administration and
Economics
University of Bielefeld




Long-term incentive plans (LTIs) have become an important component of managerial
remuneration within the last decade. Companies in countries like Australia, Canada,
France, U.K. or the U.S. have already considerable experience with LTIs. In recent years,
this kind of remuneration is increasingly applied by corporations located in other countries,
too, e.g., in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands or Spain (Towers Perrin, 2001).
Although there exist various forms of equity based compensation, like phantom stocks,
restricted stocks or stock appreciation rights, the overwhelming number of ﬁrms using
LTIs relies on stock options (Towers Perrin, 2001). For example, in the U.S. nowadays
the remuneration in options exceeds the sum of salary and bonus payments by a multiple
(Hall, 1999). In Germany, the legislative lifted the ban of granting naked options to
managers in 1998, enabling the implementation of stock option programs (SOPs) as they
are internationally known. Subsequently, the number of German ﬁrms making use of this
compensation alternative increased signiﬁcantly (Bernhardt, 1999).
Typically, the popularity of SOPs is explained by two diﬀerent arguments (Smith and
Watts, 1982). On the one hand, compensating managers in options ties their remuneration
to their ﬁrm’s stock-market price which is thought to align managers’ and shareholders’
interests. On the other hand, it is conjectured that SOPs are advantageous from a tax
perspective. E.g., in the U.S. under a non-qualiﬁed stock option plan the manager’s tax
liability is deferred until he exercises his options and the employer is allowed to deduct
the exercise gain realized by his manager as a business expense. Given the ﬁrm’s tax
rate exceeds the manager’s one a SOP is mutually beneﬁcial, because the resulting tax
advantage can be distributed among managers and shareholders. However, for a clear-cut
analysis it is necessary to focus on the combined tax liability of managers and shareholders,
taking into account taxes on the corporate level.
The goal of our paper is to consider costs and beneﬁts of a SOP simultaneously. For
this reason, we provide a comprehensive analysis by recognizing incentive as well as tax
1eﬀects. Therefore, we model three levels of taxation: taxation of managerial remuner-
ation, deductibility of SOP costs on the corporate level, and capital gains taxation on
the shareholders’ level. The applied principal-agent model reveals that the decision to
implement a SOP is distorted by taxation. This holds for all tax regimes under consid-
eration. As expected, the implementation of a SOP may be prevented due to increased
costs. However, especially under asymmetric capital gains taxation, the opposite is pos-
sible, too. Further, the optimal SOP conditions might be distorted as well. E.g., given
deductibility of SOP costs on the corporate level, the optimal strike price can be reduced
as a result of tax considerations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a liter-
ature review of explanations for the application of SOPs. Further, tax regimes diﬀering
with respect to the treatment of SOPs are introduced. In the third section, we formulate
a principal-agent model and derive the optimal SOP conditions for the pre-tax situation.
This solution serves as a benchmark for the results obtained in the diﬀerent post-tax
cases presented in the fourth section. Further, all tax regimes analyzed in this paper are
illustrated by an example in the appendix. The last section concludes.
2 Empirical evidence on granting and taxing stock
options
2.1 Reasons for granting stock options
Despite the widespread use of SOPs a commonly accepted economic justiﬁcation has not
yet emerged. The three most prominent presumptions are that
1. SOPs align the objectives of management and shareholders,
2. start-up ﬁrms substitute salary by SOPs in order to reduce cash-outﬂows
3. the grant of SOPs is motivated by tax considerations.
2The ﬁrst presumption is scrutinized by empirical studies, which observe the stock
price reaction after the implementation of a SOP or LTI plan has been announced. The
idea of this approach is to analyze, whether potential shareholdes value the ﬁrm higher
due to expecting an increased management quality. Unfortunately, the results from these
studies are ambiguous. Larcker (1983, pp. 18 and 27) ﬁnds a positive stock price reaction.
However, his study suﬀers from a small sample size. Kumar and Sopariwala (1992, p. 570)
ﬁnd a positive stock price reaction as well. Findings by Brickley et al. (1985, pp. 122) and
Gaver et al. (1992, pp. 175 and 179) do not correspond, as they are not able to identify
any signiﬁcant stock price movement around the announcement date. Nevertheless, this
does not indicate the uselessness of SOPs, as the ﬁndings might be explained by restricted
information processing capacities of the market participants. Alternatively, given strongly
eﬃcient capital markets the implementation of the SOP (LTI) might have been anticipated
before the announcement, meaning that the price adaptation has taken place before the
data collection started. DeFusco et al. (1990, pp. 620 and 624) control for changes
in stock’s volatility which is another proxy for the eﬀectiveness of SOPs. As expected,
an increasing volatility after SOP announcements was observed. This ﬁnding conﬁrms
that managers are motivated to invest less conservative, which is in the interest of well-
diversiﬁed shareholders. Recent studies by Aboody (1996) and Ferris et al. (1998) seem
to conﬁrm the eﬀectiveness of SOPs as well, although Aboody ﬁnds that a positive price
reaction on a SOP announcement is followed by a negative one during the options’ lifetime.
In general, the incentive and interest aligning hypothesis seems to be acceptable.
Empirical evidence supporting the second hypothesis is given in Yermack (1995, p. 263),
who ﬁnds that ﬁrms will substitute cash payments by option grants if they are in a bad
liquidity position. The ﬁndings by Matsunaga (1995, p. 2) and Kulatilaka and Marcus
(1994, p. 46) can be interpreted analogously, because they state that proﬁts of start-ups
shown in the P&L would be reduced up to 50% if the ﬁrms had to expense the SOP costs
according to an option pricing model. Further, several studies based on the seminal paper
3of Smith and Watts (1992) ﬁnd that the granting of SOPs and the growth opportunities
feasible to a ﬁrm are positively correlated (Baber et al., 1996, p. 301; Gaver and Gaver,
1995, p. 30; Collins et al., 1995, p. 44; Bizjak et al., 1993, p. 352). But their results can
be interpreted in two diﬀerent ways. On the one hand, ﬁrms with growth opportunities
could be regarded as young start-ups, meaning the liquidity-based reasoning is supported.
On the other hand, it could be argued that companies with growth opportunities rely on
intangible assets like management’s know-how, resulting in an informational asymmetry
between managers and shareholders, giving the management the opportunity to decide
opportunistically. Thus, the implementation of SOPs can be regarded as an instrument
for aligning objectives, supporting the ﬁrst presumption.
The last presumption is supported by two empirical studies conducted by Hite and
Long (1982) and Long (1992). They ﬁnd that changes in the U.S. tax code are followed
by changes in the design of SOPs (see also Smith and Watts, 1982, pp. 150). Summing
up, empirical evidence for each presumption can be found. However, the second one is
not able to explain the widespread use of SOPs especially among mature ﬁrms. Thus, we
will focus on the interest aligning and the tax hypothesis.
2.2 Various tax regimes
As has been stated in the introduction a clear-cut analysis requires to analyze the com-
bined tax burden on the managerial, corporate, and shareholder level. However, tax
regimes vary widely over diﬀerent countries. Thus, it is necessary to identify the most
important tax features for each taxational level:
1. On the manager’s level, most importantly, it has to be considered when the options
are taxed as ordinary income and whether the favourably purchased stocks are
subject to –possibly preferential– capital gains taxation when sold in advance.
Referring to the ﬁrst point up-front taxation has to be distinguished from exercise
taxation. Under an up-front regime the options are taxed when they are granted.
4The tax base is deﬁned as the options’ market value determined either by an option
pricing method or a rule of thumb. Under exercise taxation, the exercise proﬁt,
deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the stock price SE in the instant of exercise, tE,
and the strike price X, is taxed in tE. Additionally, proﬁts from selling the acquired
stocks in tS might be taxed as capital gains under both regimes.
Most industrialized countries tax upon exercise. Among the few countries practicing
an up-front taxation are Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland. Some kind of
hybrid taxation is practiced in Austria (Knoll, 2002, p. 328). Interestingly, in Brazil
options are regularly not taxed as ordinary income (Towers Perrin, 2001, p. 11).
Instead, the acquired stock is subject to a capital gains taxation only. In many other
countries, the capital gains taxation is applied additionally to an exercise taxation,
e.g. in the U.K. or the U.S. Contrary, in Germany or Austria, capital gains resulting
from selling the favourably acquired stocks are not generally taxed at the moment.
A more detailed overview over the international taxation of SOPs is given in table
3 in the appendix.
2. On the corporate level the most important tax factor is, whether the proﬁt dilution
induced by the SOP can be expensed for tax purposes or not. In the U.S., according
to a correspondence principle the exercise gains realized by the option-holders are
deducted as a business expense (IRC Sec. 83 (h) and Sec. 162). In contrast, e.g. in
the U.K. or in Germany, it is prohibited to deduct the SOP-induced proﬁt dilution
as a business expense (Bernhardt, 2001, p. 431).
3. For the shareholders’ level it has to be considered, whether realized proﬁts from
stock price increases are taxed as capital gains. In most countries this is the case,
exceptions are Austria, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. Some tax codes
contain special capital gains tax rules subject to the percentage ownership or the
legal structure of the ﬁrm.
5The major results from the discussion above are summed up in table 1. Combining
the three levels of taxation leads to eight possible constellations, which can be generated
by choosing one element of each column:
Table 1
Combinations of diﬀerent levels of taxation
manager level ﬁrm level shareholder level
up-front taxation SOP-costs are deductible taxation of capital gains
exercise taxation SOP-costs are non-deductible no taxation of capital gains
In the following we will neglect the up-front taxation on the manager’s level since
it is only rarely applied. Apart from the pre-tax case given as the benchmark solution
in section 3 the diﬀerent tax regimes will be presented in section 4 as depicted in the
following table:
Table 2
Tax regimes discussed in this paper
section 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.3
case Germany hypothetical U.K. U.S.
instant of taxation exercise exercise exercise exercise
SOP-costs not deductible deductible not deductible deductible
capital gains no taxation no taxation taxation taxation
Three of the four post-tax cases represent –on an idealized level– the existing tax
regimes applied to SOPs in the U.S., the U.K. and Germany.
3 Assumptions and benchmark solution
3.1 Model design
We consider a listed company which is owned by a large number of shareholders, where a
blockholder does not exist. Consequently, the ﬁrm is run by its executive managers, who
have a discretionary decision scope. The shareholders implement a SOP as a means of
aligning interests. Other incentive mechanisms or control devices are not feasible, so that
interdependencies between diﬀerent incentives can be neglected.1
6The situation is analyzed by formulating a principal-agent model. A single principal
represents the shareholders, meaning they are assumed to have a commonly shared in-
terest in the ﬁrm. Similarly, the executive managers are personated by a single agent.
Disregarding conﬂicting interests within the groups of shareholders and managers high-
lights potential goal conﬂicts between these two groups.
We assume the principal to be risk-neutral, whereas the agent behaves risk-averse with
respect to compensation, modelled by a power utility function U(r) = rγ with γ ∈]0,1[,
where r denotes the managerial remuneration resulting from the SOP and γ the degree
of risk aversion.2 Further, the agent suﬀers from disutility of eﬀort V e,e ∈ {a,0}. We
assume that the agent provides a basic eﬀort level compensated by the salary. If the
agent is motivated by the SOP to work harder or with a higher quality, respectively,
he provides an additional (non-basic) eﬀort inducing a non-negative disutility, V a > 0.
With no additional eﬀort the disutility is V 0 = 0. Utility is assumed additive separable
in remuneration and eﬀort.
Due to the changed quality of managerial arrangements the agent’s eﬀort has an
impact on the distribution of the stock price movements. Assuming a discrete probability
distribution with three possible states (upward, constant, downward), the following ﬁgure
1 depicts the inﬂuence of the managerial eﬀort on the stock price movement.
Figure 1
Probability distributions of the change in ﬁrm value,
both with and without additional managerial eﬀort
7
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1Given no additional eﬀort, all states are equally likely, represented by the following
distribution function:
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where ∆ is an exogenously-given ﬁrm-speciﬁc constant representing the possible change
of the ﬁrm value ∆S. An additional eﬀort increases the probability of an upward and
decreases the probability of a downward movement:
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, (2)
with ε < 1
3. We consider two time instants: t0 denotes the implementation date of the
SOP, tE the instant of exercise given the stock price exceeds the strike price. Without
loss of generality deﬁne one share to exist in t0. Consequently, the initial value of the ﬁrm
is equal to the current stock price S0. S0+∆S represents the value of the ﬁrm in tE prior
to exercise. Further, we assume that the options granted conﬁrm the right to purchase
a multiple π of the ﬁrm’s initial number of shares requiring an outlay of πX, where X
represents the options’ strike price. E.g., π = 2 means that twice the number of existing
shares is conditionally granted to the manager. The manager’s amount of holding after
exercise is π
1+π. Legal restrictions limiting the maximal number of options granted are
neglected. Moreover, we abstract from any kind of exercise restriction meaning that the
strike price X and the number of granted options π are the only relevant factors.
3.2 Benchmark solution: Optimal SOP conditions in a tax-free
world
Given the management’s exercise behavior and the share price’s reaction on the manager’s
additional eﬀort, we are able to model explicitly the eﬀects resulting from taxation taking
into account dilution eﬀects. In general, strike prices X < S0 − ∆ can never be optimal
from the shareholder’s perspective as they provide counterproductive incentives; the proof




3), they cancel out, meaning remuneration having the
intended incentive eﬀect can only be cost-minimizing iﬀ X ≥ S0. Using the probability
distributions speciﬁed above the agency problem without taxes can be formulated as
follows. The shareholder’s objective function Ω is deﬁned by:
Ω(π,X) = p
1
L · (−∆) + p
1






(S0 + ∆ + πX) − S0

→π,X max (3)
Economically, the shareholder maximizes the expected growth of wealth by optimally
choosing π and X. Since X ≥ S0, the ﬁrst two addends in (3) correspond to states with
no exercise. These terms are irrelevant for the optimal SOP conditions given a SOP is
implemented. Contrary, for a rising ﬁrm value, the manager receives newly issued shares.
This leads to a dilution eﬀect represented by the fraction 1
1+π. The ﬁnal wealth of the
ﬁrm consists of the initial wealth S0, the increase in wealth ∆ and the manager’s payment
of the strike price πX. As we focus on increments, the initial wealth S0 belonging to the
initial shareholder only has to be deducted. The modiﬁed objective function Ωmod is given
by:
Ω
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The agent’s objective function, called incentive constraint (IC), restricts the shareholder’s
optimization. The manager maximizes his expected total utility by adjusting his eﬀort,
i.e., by choosing from the set of feasible distribution functions:
IC (π,X) = p
1
L · 0 + p
1
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The incentive constraint is a requirement on the SOP conditions. It ensures that the agent
will provide additional eﬀort if his expected utility from remuneration, net of the disutility
9of eﬀort, exceeds his expected utility when providing no additional eﬀort. Taking into
account X ≥ S0, from (5) follows that ∆ ≥ α1+π
π must hold. Further, a participation
constraint (PC) has to be considered:
PC (π,X) = p
1
L · 0 + p
1






(S0 + ∆ − X)
γ
− V
a ≥ 0 (6)
It indicates that the agent will participate in the SOP only if it grants a non-negative
additional utility. Comparing (5) and (6) shows that the participation constraint is redun-
dant, because the right-hand side of (5) is non-negative. Since the shareholder maximizes
his expected growth of wealth, it can never be optimal to reduce the strike price below the
critical threshold. Hence, in (5) the strict inequality can be replaced by equality, meaning
the optimal strike price is deﬁned as a function of the granted share fraction.
However, with this function only the optimal program conditions are deﬁned given it is
advantageous to implement a SOP. In the next step, a condition ensuring the optimality of
granting options is derived. This is done by comparing the shareholder’s wealth diﬀerences
resulting from the possible eﬀort levels:
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Note that for a high impact of the additional eﬀort (ε → 0), the condition reduces to
∆ ≥ α, and for a low impact (ε → 1
3), the condition becomes ∆ → ∞. This means that
∆ has to be suﬃciently high to ensure the implementation of a SOP is advantageous for
the shareholder. Since the conditions (5) and (7) do not contradict each other, sets of
parameters resulting in the optimality of a SOP implementation exist.
Given a SOP is favourable, X = S0+∆−α1+π
π has to be inserted into the shareholder’s
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H (∆ − α) (8)
10Since this expression is independent of π every (π,X)-combination satisfying conditions
(5) and (7) is an optimal solution. A prominent case is given by the exercise price X = S0,
which is commonly used in real-world SOPs. The corresponding optimal share fraction






Further, as can be inferred from α every optimal solution is a function of the manager’s
individual utility function, i.e., his risk aversion γ and his eﬀort aversion V a, and the
probability distribution describing the expected future ﬁrm value.
4 Optimal SOP conditions with taxes
4.1 Taxation of managerial remuneration
Regardless of the preferential treatment of SOPs compared to ordinary salary the remu-
neration resulting from stock options is subject to tax in most industrialized countries. To
focus on the eﬀects of managerial taxation, taxes on the ﬁrm as well as on the shareholder
level are neglected in this section, meaning the German case is considered here. The man-
ager’s exercise gain is taxed with the rate τM. Neglecting taxation on the other levels, the
shareholder’s modiﬁed objective function formally remains unchanged, compared to the
tax-free world and is still given by (4). With the same reasoning as above, X < S0 can
never be cost-minimizing. Nevertheless, the optimal SOP conditions change, since the
manager has to be compensated for the wage tax. This results in the post-tax incentive
constraint:
IC (π,X,τM) = p
1
L · 0 + p
1
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Evidently, the partial derivative of the right-hand side of (10) with respect to τM is
negative. Hence, an increasing tax rate induces a decreasing strike price holding the
11granted share fraction constant. As in the tax-free case the participation constraint is
redundant. Replacing the inequality by equality and inserting (10) into the modiﬁed












Again, each (π,X)-combination satisfying (10) is optimal. For the special case X = S0




∆(1 − τM) − α
(12)
Comparing (12) with the tax-free case (9) discloses that the optimal share fraction π∗ rises
with an increasing managerial tax rate τM. Economically, the management demands a
constant post-tax remuneration for compensating the disutility of eﬀort V a that is an
individual constant and herewith unaﬀected by taxation. The same explanation applies
for the decreased strike price given a constant share fraction as revealed in (10).
Apart from the tax impact on the optimal SOP conditions taxation can alter the
decision whether to implement a SOP at all. The optimality condition for granting options
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As the taxation on the managerial level raises their costs SOPs will be implemented less
frequently. Positive incentive eﬀects are foregiven due to this kind of non-neutral taxation.
4.2 Deductibility of managerial remuneration at the ﬁrm level
Integrating the ﬁrm level into the model speciﬁed in the previous section allows to analyse
the incentive eﬀects caused by the deductibility of the SOP costs incurred by the dilution
eﬀect. This leads to the hypothetical case mentioned in table 2. In contrast to taxation
12solely on the managerial level, deductibility on the corporate level reduces the costs of a
SOP. Since marginal tax rates are assumed to fall short of 100%, a positive net contribution
by the shareholder to managerial remuneration remains. For this reason, strike prices
X < S0−∆ can never be optimal under deductibility as well. It can be shown that strike
prices X < S0 can be optimal only in extreme cases (see appendices C and D.2). This
section primarily focuses on the typical case X ≥ S0.
Under this assumption the shareholder’s modiﬁed objective function is:
Ω
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1+πτC
π
1+π (∆ + S0 − X)

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(∆ + S0 − X) is the exercise gain realised by the manager weighted with his post-exercise
share fraction π
1+π. This gives the total remuneration costs. Multiplying with the cor-
porate tax rate τC yields the total tax shield on managerial remuneration. Since the
manager, now being shareholder as well, participates in the tax reimbursement, the frac-
tion belonging to the original shareholder has to be separated by multiplying with the
fraction 1
1+π. Accordingly, the incentive constraint becomes:
IC (π,X) = p
1
L · 0 + p
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(15)
δ represents the total utility the agent receives given the ﬁrm’s wealth position remains
unchanged. As it cancels out, it can be disregarded here. Using the same arguments as
above, for optimality (15) has to hold with equality. Dropping the inequality sign and
inserting (15) into the modiﬁed objective function (14) yields:
Ω





α(1 + π − τC)
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Comparing (16) with the modiﬁed objective functions (8) and (11), it emerges for the ﬁrst
time that the shareholder’s objective function depends on the option conditions since the
13fraction of granted shares π appears in (16). Hence, the shareholder is no longer indiﬀerent
between arbitrarily chosen combinations of X and π satisfying the incentive constraint
(15) with equality. This phenomenon is caused by the possibility for tax arbitrage: for
τC > τM, the tax shield on the corporate level exceeds the manager’s tax payment.
In order to derive the optimal share fraction π the derivative of the modiﬁed objective
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2

R 0 ⇔ τM R τC (17)
Depending on the diﬀerence of the tax rates on the corporate and the managerial level
three cases have to be distinguished:
1. τM = τC: If the tax rates are identical, the tax payment on the manager’s level and
the tax shield on the corporate level cancel out leading to the benchmark solution
(8): Ωmod = p1
H · (∆ − α). From a comparison of (15) with the tax-free case (5)
follows that identical managerial and corporate tax rates induce a lower strike price,
given a constant fraction π. Accordingly, for a given strike price the fraction of
granted options increases compared to the tax-free case. The resulting strike price
is calculated in a way that the corresponding tax shield exactly oﬀsets the higher
gross managerial remuneration necessary to compensate for his tax burden. Despite
the impact of taxation on the optimal SOP parameters, the identity of tax rates on
the corporate and the managerial level implies neutrality of taxation with respect
to the decision to implement a SOP.
2. τM > τC: Since it is more costly to compensate the manager by options than via
the participation in the tax reimbursement, which is not subject to the manager’s
individual tax rate, the shareholder tends to maximize the fraction of this prefer-
entially treated compensation component. From (17) it follows that π should be
chosen inﬁnitely high, which means that the shareholder gives an option to acquire
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α
1 − τM + τC
(18)
3. τM < τC: From the negativity of the derivative (17) it follows that from the set of
feasible π-X-combinations the one with the smallest π is chosen given it is optimal
to exclude strike prices below S0. Consequently, the resulting strike price is X =
S0. The corresponding share fraction is given by the positive root of a quadratic
equation:
π|X=S0 = −
∆(1 − τM) − 2α
2(∆(1 − τM + τC) − α)
+
s
∆(1 − τM) − 2α




(1 − τM + τC)∆ − α
(19)
Economically, this result can be explained by the fact that the manager participates
in the tax reimbursement after exercise, which can be seen from (15). In contrast to
the preceeding case, remuneration in options is now less costly than letting the man-
ager participate in the tax reimbursement. Consequently, the shareholder minimizes
the fraction of the tax shield given to the manager. In eﬀect, the part of the tax
reimbursement attributable to the manager serves as a substitute for remuneration,
meaning a higher exercise price X for a given fraction π compared to the tax-free
case can be set.
In contrast to the preceeding sections it can be shown that due to tax arbitrage
strike prices below S0 can be optimal in extreme cases (τC  τM). An example is
provided in appendix D.2. Some legislations, e.g. Italy, exclude preferential taxa-
tion for strike prices below S0. Interestingly, this may lead to contrarian eﬀects as
taxation favours lower strike prices in the present case.
15The decision to implement a SOP can be heavily distorted by taxation, too. Excluding
strike prices X < S0 the implementation condition can be written as:
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with
1 + π − τC
1 − τM + π (1 + τC − τM)
R 1 ⇔ τM R τC (22)
Only in the ﬁrst case (τC = τM) taxation is neutral with respect to the decision to
implement a SOP. In contrast, in the second case (τM > τC) SOPs will be implemented
less frequently than in the tax-free case because the negative eﬀect caused by managerial
taxation dominates the positive eﬀect of the tax reimbursement. In the third case (τC >
τM), taxation might induce the implementation of SOPs that would not be advantageous
for the shareholder in the tax-free case.
4.3 Capital Gains Taxation
Capital gains realized by the shareholder are subject to –possibly preferential– taxation
in several countries. In this section, it is assumed that the shareholder sells his shares
immediately after the end of the SOP. Assuming the shareholder acquired his shares in t0,
S0 serves as the initial costs for calculating the capital gain. Depending on the terminal
value of the ﬁrm a positive or negative tax base may result. Positive capital gains are
taxed at the rate τG, capital losses at the rate τL. Asymmetric treatment of capital
gains and losses (τG > τL) may be induced by an incomplete loss-oﬀset observable under
most legislations. A further distinction arises with respect to deductibility of SOP costs
as discussed in the previous section. With τC > 0, the U.S. case is considered, wheras
τC = 0 represents the U.K. case.
16From the manager’s perspective, the sales revenue coincides with the initial costs given
by the share price at date tE resulting in a zero capital gains tax base.3 Hence, the incen-
tive constraint (15) and the (redundant) participation constraint remain unchanged. In
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In the downward state, no options are exercised and the manager does not participate in
the resulting capital loss of ∆. In the constant state, neither an exercise nor a capital gain
occur. In the upward state, the shareholder realizes a capital gain given by the modiﬁed
objective function (14).
Assuming symmetric capital gains taxation (τG = τL) the objective function (23)
corresponds to the non-modifed objective function from section 4.2, multiplied by the
constant (1−τG). In this case, neither the optimal SOP conditions nor the optimality of
implementing an SOP change.
Because of the unchanged incentive constraint asymmetric capital gains taxation
(τG > τL) does not have an impact on the optimal SOP conditions as well if the ex-
treme case (τC  τM) identiﬁed in section 4.2 is neglected. However, the decision to
implement the SOP is distorted because the shareholder’s costs and beneﬁts are aﬀected
asymmetrically. Without an SOP, the importance of the downward state increases be-
cause the tax reimbursement falls short of the tax payment in the upward state. Hence,
avoiding the downward state is advantageous to the shareholder, meaning that SOPs are
implemented more frequently compared to the pre-tax case.
175 Conclusion
We analyzed the impact of diﬀerent tax regimes on the implementation decision and the
design of SOPs. Under taxation of managerial remuneration only, the manager demands
a higher gross income and SOPs become more expensive. This leads to the conclusion
that SOPs which are advantageous in the pre-tax case are possibly not realized in the
presence of taxation. This eﬀect might be oﬀset by deductibility of SOP costs on the
corporate level. Depending on the ratio of the tax rates τM and τC very high or very low
strike prices may be optimal illustrating that this case is very sensitive to variations of tax
parameters. Integrating symmetric capital gains taxation, neither the optimality nor the
optimal conditions of a SOP are altered. In contrast, asymmetric capital gains taxation
favours the implementation of SOPs while leaving their optimal conditions unchanged.
These results have implications for ﬁscal as well as entrepreneurial decisions. From a
tax policy perspective, changing a single tax parameter requires taking into account the
interdependencies between diﬀerent levels of taxation. Deviations from neutral taxation
may induce welfare losses. From an entrepreneurial perspective, SOP conditions approved
under a particular legislation should not simply be transferred. Rather, a comprehensive
analysis of the host country’s tax system is indispensable. As a result, neglecting taxation
may induce wrong decisions and a waste of funds.
Appendix
A Tax legislation on SOPs
Because one important factor in our analysis is the taxation on the management level,
which varies over diﬀerent countries, we provide a survey of the taxation of stock options
in the following table 3 mainly based on Towers Perrin (2001) and M¨ ussener and Prahs
(2000). Additional references are given in the column ‘notes’.
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Australia tE yes yes
Austria tE hybrid no part of the exercise gain is cal-
culated as if an up-front tax-
ation would take place (see
Knoll, 2002)
Belgium t0 0.15·S0 no reduction of the tax base to
0.075·S0 under certain condi-
tions possible (see Bartholm´ e
and Strickx, 1999; Bernhardt,
2001)
Brazil tS yes yes
Canada tE SE − X yes yes
France tS (SS−SE)+
(SE − X)
yes yes proﬁt in the ﬁrst parantheses
is taxed regularly, the diﬀer-
ence in second parantheses is
taxed preferentially (see Gin-
ter and Deis, 2001)
Germany tE SE − X no no (see Guenkel and Hagen,
2002)
Italy tE SE − X yes no taxation in tE only if X < S0
(see Serbini, 2000)
Japan tE SE − X yes yes (see Katsushima, 1997)
Netherlands t0 legally de-
ﬁned option
value
no yes taxation of capital gains if op-







no yes (see Knoll, 2002) options with
terms longer than 10 years are
taxed in tE
U.K. tE SE − X yes yes
U.S. tE SE − X yes yes (see Phillips et al., 2002)
19B Maximum number of strike prices
Lemma: For any given π there are at most two strike prices X that solve the incentive
constraint with equality.
Proof: Not excluding strike prices X < S0−∆ the incentive constraint would be given
by:
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Since γ < 1, the second term in braces exceeds the ﬁrst one. Hence, the derivative is














(S0 + ∆ − X)
γ−1
< 0 (27)
Thus, there are at most two X= solving (24) with equality. If no X satisﬁes (24) with
equality for a given π the SOP is not feasible. If there is only one solution for the optimal
strike price, X∗ ≥ S0−∆ holds (see ﬁgure). For two X= in the relevant interval the strike
price X ≥ S0 − ∆ is optimal from the shareholder’s point of view. This corresponds to
economic intuition because for a given π a higher strike price induces a lower probability
for exercise combined with a smaller dilution eﬀect.
20Figure 2
Existence of feasible solutions for the SOP
In case I (solid ordinate), there are two intersections of f(x) and V a in the relevant
interval ]0,∞[, meaning that two positive strike prices satisfy the incentive constraint.
Of course, the shareholder chooses the greater one, leading to a higher proﬁt. In case II
(dashed ordinate), only one feasible solution exists. Due to the function’s curvature this
solution must be positive.
C A lower bound for strike prices
Lemma: From the shareholder’s perspective, strike prices S0 − ∆ ≤ X < S0 can only be
optimal for τC > τM.
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(28)
Inserting the strike price from the incentive constraint (15) and deriving (28) with respect
21
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for S0 − ∆ < X < S0
(29)
Obviously, the last derivative can only be negative for τC > τM.
D Numerical Examples
The following numerical examples illustrate the impact of the diﬀerent tax regimes de-
scribed in the preceeding sections. The parameters common for all examples are:
Table 4
General parameters for the numerical examples
parameter variable value






downward probability with additional eﬀort p1
L = ε 1
10




upward probability with additional eﬀort p1
H = 2
3 − ε 17
30
initial share price S0 100
possible change of the ﬁrm value ∆ 10
disutility of eﬀort V a 1
5
risk aversion parameter γ 1
2
D.1 Taxation of managerial remuneration
The pre-tax case (τM = 0) is compared with the case of taxation on the managerial level
for τM = 0.5, τM = 0.91, and τM = 0.92.
Table 5
SOP conditions for diﬀerent managerial tax rates
τM 0 0.5 0.91 0.92
X 100 100 100 (100)
π (X) 0.079 0.172 4.444 (11.250)
shareholder’s beneﬁt from SOP 4.250 3.834 0.041 (-0.537)
manager’s net beneﬁt from SOP 0.286 0.286 0.286 (0.286)
22For τM = 0.5, a SOP is implemented. π = 0.172 means that the manager holds a
post-exercise fraction of the ﬁrm of π
1+π = 14.68%. For a tax rate between 91% and
92% the decision to implement changes. Whereas a SOP would be advantageous for the
shareholder given a managerial tax rate of 91%, it becomes harmful for τM = 92%. The
parentheses in the last column indicate that the parameters are hypothetical as the SOP
is not realized. Note that the critical tax rate depends on ∆. Changing the example’s
global variable, e.g., for ∆ = 2, the critical tax rate is τM = 55.4%.
D.2 Deductibility of managerial remuneration at the ﬁrm level
Holding τM = 0.5 constant, the corporate tax rate is set to τC = 0.25, τC = 0.5, τC = 0.6,
and τC = 0.99:
Table 6
Optimal SOP conditions for diﬀerent corporate tax rates
τC 0 0.25 0.5 0.6 0.99
X 100 109.02 100 100 90
π (X) 0.172 → ∞ 0.149 0.146 0.070
shareholder’s beneﬁt from SOP 3.834 4.112 4.250 4.322 4.596
manager’s net beneﬁt from SOP 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.286
For τC < τM, the strike price is chosen as high as possible in connection with π → ∞.
This means the entire ﬁrm is sold to the manager as expensive as possible. For τC = τM,
the pre-tax case emerges. For τC > τM, there is at least one critical τC where strike
prices X < S0 become optimal. The tax shield increasing in τC explains the increase in
the shareholder’s beneﬁt.
D.3 Capital Gains Taxation
For symmetric capital gains taxation (τG = τL), an example is omitted since there are
no eﬀects that could be demonstrated. For the case of asymmetric capital gains taxation,
the managerial and corporate tax are neglected (τM = τC = 0). The capital gains tax
23rates are τG = 0.5 and τL = 0.2. Further, ∆ = 0.8 is set in order to demonstrate a change
in the implementation decision. In contrast to the pre-tax case, under a capital gains tax,
a SOP is advantageous.
Table 7
SOP conditions under asymmetric capital gains taxation
pre-tax case capital gains tax
X (100) 100
π (X) (11.25) 11.25
shareholder’s beneﬁt from SOP -0.043 -0.045
shareholder’s beneﬁt without SOP 0 -0.08
Although the shareholder’s beneﬁt from the SOP is negative under a capital gains tax,
it would be realized because the alternative is even worse.
Notes
1For an overview over the diﬀerent types of manager-shareholder conﬂicts refer to Byrd et al. (1998,
p. 15). For mechanims mitigating these conﬂicts see Byrd et al. (1998, p. 18) or Agrawal and Knoeber
(1996).
2The diﬀerence in the assumptions on the parties’ attitudes towards risk can be justiﬁed as follows:
Shareholders can diversify their portfolio and restrict their risk-taking to the unsystematic risk, whereas
this is not feasible for managers, see Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002, p. 146) and the references cited there.
Note that a power utility function represents a decreasing absolute and a constant relative risk aversion,
see Kreps (1988, pp. 74) for the terminology. For an application of the power utility function in the
context of stock options, see Huddart (1994).
3The initial costs for tax purposes can vary under diﬀerent legislations. The prominent alternatives
are the strike price or the share price at the date of exercise.
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